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Summary  
The Innovation systems (IS) approach and the system failures it identifies, play an important 
role in the design and legitimization of innovation policy. This paper analyses the usefulness of 
this concept. We conclude that the IS-approach can be useful to visualize the complexity of the 
innovation processes. However, for policy design this approach is less suited, because system 
failures aim at symptoms in stead of underlying incentive structures. In our view, policy design 
should be based on standard economic framework of market- and government failures. 
Theoretically, an exception is the system failure path dependency. However, the empirical 
evidence for the existence of this phenomenon is mixed. Furthermore, policy initiatives to tackle 
path dependence are likely to be subject to severe government failure.  
JEL: B52, 038 
Key words: Innovation policy, Innovation systems, market failure.  
 
* corresponding author: 
Niek Nahuis 
General Financial and Economic Policy Directorate,  
Ministry of Finance,  
P.O Box 20201,  
2500 EE The Hague,  
phone: +31 (0)70 3427399, 
fax: +31 (0)70 3427325, 
e-mail: n.j.nahuis@minfin.nl. 1.  Introduction 
 
In the legitimization and design of innovation policy there seems to be a sort of Babel-like 
confusion. On the one hand, mainstream economics point to a mix of market and government 
(regulation) failures, whereas the innovation system (SI) approach, mainly used by innovation 
policy makers, emphasize system failures as an additional reason to intervene. The distinction 
between market and system failures is confusing, especially if one considers the system as the 
sum of market and government. We try to clarify this confusion by anatomizing both concepts 
and analyzing the differences. The goal of this exercise is to explore to what extent the 
innovation system approach and mainstream economics are complements or substitutes. Firstly, 
we shortly describe the toolkit of mainstream economics. Next, we describe the SI approach. 
Then, we evaluate whether the system approach and its policy recommendations are 
complementary to the analyses and policy conclusions of mainstream economics.  Finally, we 
draw conclusions.  
 
2.  Mainstream economics  
 
Mainstream economics starts by analyzing the function of markets through identifying market 
failures, which lead to suboptimal outcomes for the society as a whole (Stiglitz, 2000). External 
effects, information failures, market power and incomplete markets may cause too less 
(knowledge) or too much production (pollution). These market failures could justify 
government intervention with instruments like subsidies, taxes, regulation or public production 
of goods. However, the effectiveness of these instruments depends on the occurrence of 
government failure. Limited information, limited control over private responses, limited control 
over bureaucracy and the influence of lobbying, can reduce the effectiveness of policy 
intervention. Further, policymakers have to take into account that the financing of policy 
initiatives require distortionary taxation.   
As a short illustration of the economic approach we take public support to R&D. Theoretical 
and empirical literature point to both negative and positive external effects of R&D (Jacobs et 
al, 2001). Firstly, insufficient market power may limit the ability of a firm to internalize all 
benefits of innovation or knowledge accumulation (rent spillovers). Furthermore, the mobility 
of researchers and the inability to keep innovations in new products a secret for competitors 
create knowledge spillovers (Jaffe, 1996). Also, negative spillovers might occur because an 
innovation may reduce the profits of competitors. On average, empirical evidence points to 
positive spillovers. Policy aimed at closing the gap between social and private returns could 
increase welfare. In addition to external effects, imperfect information, network effects and 
market power of incumbent firms may justify policy intervention as well. These market failures 
may decelerate the diffusion of knowledge, although this is (partly) offset by the monopoly 
rents of early adopters of new technologies (CPB, 2002a).  
  However, government failure reduces the effectiveness of public policy. The effectiveness of 
public support for specific technologies or sectors in particular is doubtful, because the 
government usually has limited information about social and private returns, future 
technological developments and comparative advantages. Also, rent seeking and high 
transaction costs increase the risks of government failure. CPB (2002a) concludes that the 
government should interfere when market failures are most severe and when the risk of 
government failure is small. Moreover, a strong policy focus on technology is not completely 
clear from a welfare point of view. For example, the present comparative advantages of the 
Netherlands probably lie in other sectors (Boone et al, 2002). Trying to influence these 
comparative advantages in the direction of new technology is a risky business. Baldwin and 
Robert-Nicoud (2002) argue that the government will generally pick losers, because losers need 
to lobby to survive, whereas winners do not.  
  To conclude, policy solutions to address market failures are not without risk due to 
government failure. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence of the effectiveness of public programs is rare. This pleads for building evaluation mechanism into program designs. Jaffe 
(2002) suggests that this requires either partial randomization of the grant process or recording 
the rankings used in the grant evaluation.  
 
3.  The Innovation System Approach  
 
In the design of innovation policy is the key concept the Dynamic Innovation System approach. 
Innovation is not seen as a step-by-step process in which R&D activities automatically lead to 
innovation and commercialization of new products (linear system), but as a complex, 
interactive, and interdependent process of all organizations and subjects (dynamic system).
 The 
output of the system depends on the complex set of relationships among actors producing, 
distributing and applying various kinds of knowledge (OECD, 1997). The concept of innovation 
systems is related to Evolutionary Economics. In both theories, individual and organizational 
behavior result not only from relative prices changes, but from routines and habits as well 
(Nelson and Winter, 2002).    
  In an innovation system different types of system failures occur. Bemer et al (2001) identify 
seven sources of market failures and three additional system failures. In this section we focus on 
the latter type of failure: too much or too little interaction, path dependency and lock-in, missing 
or inadequate institutions.
1  
  The first system failure is a suboptimal degree of interaction. Bemer et al (2001) mention 
insufficient interaction between firms and public knowledge institutes as an example. Firms do 
not innovate in isolation, but innovation is an outcome of interactions among firms and between 
firms and public knowledge institutes (Nelson, 1994; Lundvall, 1988). In an innovation system 
learning processes are crucial for the innovative performance of the system (Edquist, 2001). 
                                                       
1 Somewhat confusing is that the description of system failures differs in the literature. For example Smith (1996) 
distinguish three system failures (provision of infrastructure, transition and lock-in). Malerba (1996) points to five 
system failures (learning failure, exploitation-exploration trade off, variety-selection trade-off, appropriability traps, 
complementarities failures). Edquist (2001) suggests that market failures are irrelevant in a system approach. He Hence, insufficient interaction leads to suboptimal learning and too little transfer of knowledge 
in the system. Bemer et al (2001) argue that the government should stimulate interaction by 
acting as a knowledge broker, distributing information (cluster studies, technology roadmaps) 
and stimulating joint research projects and networks. Too much interaction can also occur if too 
frequent contacts between private agents lead to habit formation (collusion) which delays 
innovative efforts.
2 More intensive competition policy and another design of contracting out 
methods could address this failure.  
  A second system failure is missing or inadequate institutions. Institutions are supposed to 
influence the development and diffusion of new technologies and knowledge. Therefore missing 
or inadequate institutions break the chain of interactions in the innovation system. The literature 
gives examples like the absence of certain knowledge institutions or insufficient demand for 
new innovative products. The IS-approach points to the creating these institutions and 
stimulating (high-tech) starters (creating demand) as policy solutions for these problems.  
  The third category of system failures are path dependency and lock-in. Path dependence is 
adopted from evolutionary economics, which states that agents decide on the basis of past 
experience because of high transaction costs or lack of information (Metcalfe, 1995; Nelson and 
Winter, 2002). These rules of thumbs are relatively insensitive to small changes in relative 
prices. Since firms find it difficult to evolve beyond a particular scientific and technological 
paradigm, they get locked-in in existing technologies. As a consequence, production 
specialization patterns adjust slowly (Edquist, 2001). Edquist argues that policy should 
intervene in an early stage of the emergence of new technological systems by stimulating shifts 
into new technologies. 
   
4.  Innovation system and mainstream economics: complements or substitutes?  
                                                                                                                                                             
recognizes four system failures; missing functions, organizations and institutions and a lack of interaction in the 
innovation system.  
2 This problem is less often mentioned in the literature and policy documents. For example, in the ministry of 
Economic Affairs (2003) the focus is on too little interaction in the assessment of bottlenecks in the innovation 
system and not on too much interaction.    
In this section, we analyze the system failures described above with the mainstream economic 
toolkit. Our main aim is to establish whether the system approach and the corresponding 
problems are additional to or overlapping with the market failures of mainstream economics.  
  
Interaction  
  The first system failure, too little interaction, causes suboptimal knowledge transfer and 
diffusion. Two remarks need to be made. In the first place, it is not clear what would be the 
optimal level of interaction; is more interaction always better? And if one accepts that 
interaction is “too” low, then why is it too low? Economics provide more understanding of this 
kind of problems. Market failures such as imperfect information, high transaction costs and 
market power can cause a suboptimal level of interaction (transactions), and hence slow 
diffusion of knowledge. A first potential candidate to explain the lack of interaction is 
information problem. High transaction costs, search costs or uncertainty about future 
development can prevent (rational) firms from investing in profitable innovations or from 
investigating or adopting alternative technologies. This implies that low interaction is the result 
of a cost-benefit analysis by the firm, which indicates that transaction costs are larger than the 
potential gains of adopting new technologies. Secondly, market power diminishes the need for 
firms to adopt new knowledge. Hence, if the need to stay ahead of competitors is absent, firms 
will make insufficient use of available (public) knowledge (Bartelsman & Hinloopen, 2002).  
 
Bemer et al (2001) point to the inadequate interaction between public research institutes and the 
private sector as a system failure. Again, our first question is: what is the optimal degree of 
interaction? Then, from an economic point of view, two responses are possible. First, it depends 
on the aim of government whether this is a problem. If the aim is to stimulate fundamental 
research in universities because of the positive external effects, interaction with firms may give 
researchers incentives to avoid fundamental research. Interaction may then even be undesirable (CPB, 2002a). Hence, in the case of universities, incentives should be directed towards 
scientific quality. Second, if the aim is to enhance the applicability of fundamental research by 
intermediary institutes for applied research, the question remains why existing firms and 
institutes for applied research do not interact. In the case of firms, this may be due to 
insufficient incentives as a result of market power, as explained above. On the supply side, there 
might be a principal-agent problem if government does not succeed in giving applied research 
institutes (the agent) sufficiently high-powered incentives to interact with its customers. To 
conclude, it seems that in these cases, the system failure of too little interaction is a symptom of 
underlying market or government failures.  
 
Missing or inadequate institutions.  
  This system failure seems to be a somewhat broad set of different problems. Both the nature 
and the solutions to these problems differ. Bemer et al (2001) mention, among others, the 
following examples: insufficient supply of venture capital, inadequate resources for (high-tech) 
starters, insufficient demand for new innovations and the absence of certain knowledge 
institutions. Once more, we ask ourselves how the IS-approach determines if something is 
insufficient or inadequate operational from a welfare point of view. Despite this main critique, 
we will shortly discuss the above mentioned examples in order to asses the similarities or 
differences between the IS-approach an the economic approach.    
  Insufficient supply of venture capital and missing or inadequate facilities for starters is 
supposed to reduce the adoption of innovations. Hall (2002) argues that starters can 
theoretically face higher financing costs. Starters have to search for external financing, whereas 
established firms can rely on internal financing. In the case of financing R&D, standard market 
failures (asymmetric information, moral hazard) and government failure (tax considerations) 
could drive a wedge between internal and external financing favoring existing large firms. 
However, the market also provides solutions to these market failures. Venture capitalists are 
normally well-informed and monitor their investment quite intensively, which reduces information asymmetries and the risk of moral hazard. Furthermore, a low degree of supply of 
venture capital can also be an efficient market outcome if there are no profitable investment 
opportunities. In retrospect, the amount of (venture) capital supplied to dot-com firms at the end 
of the 90’s was probably higher than socially optimal. Hence, an apparently insufficient supply 
of capital does not always indicate a failure in the innovation system.  
 
  According to the IS-approach, suboptimal diffusion of knowledge can also be caused by 
insufficient innovative demanders. However, it is difficult to imagine why agents in existing 
organizations and firms have no incentives to adopt new technologies. Again, a market failure 
explaining “insufficient” innovative demand is market power. For example, Baily (2001) 
suggests that in the U.S., competition has been a major reason for the existence of high demand 
for innovations. However, slow adoption of new technologies can also be the result of market 
forces. For example, Manuelli and Seshadri (2003) conclude that the slow transformation from 
horses to tractors in U.S. agriculture in the 1940s can simply be explained by the fact that a 
more intensive use of tractors was not cost effective. Instead of purchasing a new expensive 
tractor, farmers bought a (cheaper) conversion kit to transform their car into a “tractor”, despite 
attempts of Ford to forbid the sale of these conversion kits by Ford dealers (Kline and Pinch, 
1996). Another market failure which might explain apparently insufficient innovative demand is 
network externality; the resulting coordination problem induces prohibitively high switching 
costs for the individual firm (see path dependency).   
  Missing research institutes are supposed to hamper the transfer of scientific research to the 
market. However, the relevant question is; if profitable opportunities exist for applied research 
or for the conversion of the outcome of fundamental research to marketable products and 
processes, then why are those not seized by public or private research organizations? Again, 
market failures point to insufficient incentives on the demand side (competition) or – in the case 
of public institutes for applied research – to government failure on the supply side (principal 
agent problem).     Hence, in most cases, the system failure of missing or inadequate institutions is no more than a 
symptom of underlying incentive problems caused by market failure.  
  
Path dependence and lock-in.  
  Path dependence and lock-in, as interpreted by Edquist (2001), differ most 
fundamentally from mainstream economics. Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) distinguish three 
types of path dependence. First-degree path dependence occurs if initial actions lead to a path 
that cannot be left without some costs, but given the transaction costs, this path is efficient and 
agents are rational. Second-degree path dependence implies that decisions are based on 
imperfect information. As a result, ex-post a different path is superior to the chosen one, but ex 
ante, given the information constraint, agents act rational. Both first-degree and second-degree 
path dependence are commonplace in mainstream economics. Third-degree path dependence, 
the relevant one in the innovation literature, states that ex-ante the chosen path is suboptimal. 
This means that given the available information more efficient paths are available. This implies 
that irremediable errors occur, so third-degree path dependence conflicts with neo classical 
economics. However, Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) show this form of failure requires 
important restrictions on prices, institutions and foresight. This makes it very difficult to 
establish the theoretical case. Furthermore, the evidence of the empirical relevance of third-
degree path dependence is not very strong.3 Bemer et al (2001) also mention lock-in as a 
systemic failure. We follow Margolis and Liebowitz (1995), who show that lock-in is the 
outcome of path dependence.  
 
The general conclusion of the analysis of the system approach from the point of view of 
mainstream economics is that system failures are not complementary to market and government 
                                                       
3 The SI-literature as well as the economic literature (David, 1985) document some well known examples of path 
dependence such as QWERTY and VHS. However, Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) claim that most examples are in 
fact first degree or second-degree path dependence. Convincing examples of sustainable remediable errors of market 
activities (third-degree path dependence) is rare. For example, they argue that in the case of the QWERTY-keyboard 
alternative keyboards are not really superior (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990).      failure. Rather, system failures are caused by underlying incentive problems, which can be 
traced back to market or government failures. From an analytic point of view the system 
approach has little added value.  
 
5.  Policy implications 
 
From the point of view of the policy maker analytical differences between the innovation 
system approach and mainstream economics is not a problem as long as policy 
recommendations do not differ. However, policy recommendations do differ. First and 
foremost, this is caused by the fact that the system approach does not analyze the underlying 
causes of problems. Secondly, the possibility of government failure is neglected. We illustrate 
this by comparing some policy recommendations. 
 
Policy measures to increase interaction and innovative demand by stimulating networks, 
information brokerage, public consultancy and cluster studies directed at solving information 
problems stem from the system approach. However, if the problem is caused by market power 
of firms these measures are not likely to be very effective. For example, if the government 
stimulates cooperation between firms the market failure is even enlarged if market power is the 
problem. In addition, the scope for the government to solve information problems is limited as 
government agencies suffer from information problems themselves. As a result, efforts aiming 
to create formal knowledge networks are ineffective (CPB, 2002b). Moreover, the market 
addresses these problems by cooperation between firms and commercial knowledge brokers. 
Hence, government intervention in the form of public consultancy might even replace more 
efficient private initiatives.    
 
The present policy to address inadequate interaction between research institutes and private 
sector is often to use specific subsidies to correct and stimulate the behavior of institutes. However, the AWT (1999) doubts the effectiveness of this instrument, because institutions will 
spend time in rent-seeking. In addition, if the problem is caused by agency problems in the 
financing of these public research institutes, the solution lies in rethinking incentives in the 
financing rules of these institutes.  
 
Insufficient supply of venture capital and missing or inadequate facilities for starters is tackled 
by supplying starters with public venture capital and public consultancy. As discussed above, an 
apparent lack of (venture) capital can be efficient; stimulating venture capital supply will then 
result in welfare loss, because relative prices are disturbed which leads to sub-optimal allocation 
of production factors. In this case, the superior policy is ‘hands-off’. Moreover, it is not clear 
why public supply of venture capital is superior to private supply. 
 
The creation of new public-private research institutes is supposed to stimulate the transfer of 
scientific research to the market. However, as discussed before, it is likely that if a problem 
exists, it is caused by lack of competitive pressure and/or government failure in the financing 
schemes of existing public institutes for applied research. In addition, the AWT (1999) states 
that the private sector has enough incentives to perform applied research. The government 
should focus on fundamental research, especially since firms increasingly shift their R&D 
activities from fundamental to applied research (CPB, 2002a). Introducing new public-private 
research institutes, given the supply of researchers, has the risk of crowding out present 
(fundamental) research activities.     
 
Finally, the existence of third-degree path dependence might justify government intervention 
aiming at technological transition. However, the evidence for the existence of third-degree path 
dependence is mixed. In addition, policies aiming to address this failure are likely to be subject 
to severe government failure. Firstly, the government should be able to forecast the 
developments of new technologies and future comparative advantages, since relative productivity levels rather than absolute productivity levels matter in an open economy. 
Secondly, Baldwin en Robert-Nicoud (2002) point to the risk of lobbying. They argue that the 
risk of picking losers is substantial, because losers need to lobby to survive, whereas winners do 
not. Thirdly, a switch to another technology will be accompanied by severe international 
coordination problems.4 High transaction costs increase the risks of government failure and the 
ineffectiveness of specific innovation policy. To conclude, it is very doubtful whether public 
policy is able to address (third-degree) path dependence in an effective manner. 
 
6.  Conclusions.  
 
The system innovation approach has contributed in two ways to the policy debate. Firstly, this 
approach can be a useful concept to visualize the complexity of the innovation process. 
Secondly, the IS-approach points deservedly to path dependency as a potential source for 
government intervention. However, with the possible exception of third-degree path 
dependency, we do not see any additional insights of the system approach to guide innovation 
policy. This approach primarily serves to detect bottlenecks in this process. Yet, a clear 
analytical framework to analyze the behavior of agents is missing in this theory. Hence, to what 
extent these problems are the result of the incentives of different agents is less clear. Policy 
design on the outcomes of the system approach leads to recommendations aimed at symptoms 
rather than underlying incentive structures (examples are public consultancy, information 
brokerage, the creation of new research institutes and formal networks). These 
recommendations are likely to be ineffective and risk replacing more efficient private initiatives. 
In our view, innovation policy should use the standard mainstream economics toolkit for 
designing effective innovation policy solutions. As mentioned previously, the possible 
exception might be (third-degree) path dependence. However, the empirical evidence for the 
                                                       
4 For example, a switch from gasoline to hydrogen driven cars requires severe international coordination, because a 
simultaneous transformation of filling station at the international level is necessary (one should also be able to refuel existence of this phenomenon is mixed. Furthermore, policy initiatives to tackle path 
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